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Abstract 
The anthrax bacterium, when converted into a biological weapon, poses a serious threat to the 
United States military forces in battle. In order to counteract tbis threat, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) instituted the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (A VIP), which mandates 
that all military forces take the anthrax vaccine shot series. There has been a wave of 
controversy over this program, because the vaccine has not been proven as safe and effective 
against the strains of anthrax that would potentially be encountered in warfare. 
The controversy over the program has been surrounded by discussions of whether or not the 
military should be required to sign an informed consent form when given the vaccine, in order to 
ensure that they fully understand the potential benefits and risks associated with the vaccine and 
still choose to take the shot. The DoD maintains that the vaccine is completely safe and 
efficacious, and that because the vaccine is licensed, no informed consent is required. The 
military and civilians counter this argnment by stating that the vaccine is not being used for the 
condition that it was tested for, and is therefore still considered to be an investigational drug. In 
order to administer an investigational drug, and informed consent must be obtained. 
Many legal battles are being fought, both by military men and women wishing to reverse their 
discharges because of refusing the vaccine, and by military men and women who have 
experienced serious side effects as a result of the vaccine. There are also legislative actions 
being proposed, but nothing thus far has been approved. A reasonable solution would be to 
make the A VIP program voluntary until a better vaccine is developed and the long-term effects 
are more fully understood. This would allow the military personnel to make the personal 
decision of what medication they want to put into their bodies, and to be fully informed of the 
benefits and risks associated with that medication before the vaccine is administered. 
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Though countries have been studying and developing biological weapons for years, the events 
of September 11, 2001 introduced the threat to the entire world. Letters infested with the anthrax 
bacterium began to surface around the United States, causing a newfound fear in American 
citizens regarding biological and chemical warfare. By this time, however, the military had 
already put an anthrax vaccine program into place and was in the process of trying to vaccinate 
all of the troops against this bioweapon. A controversy and outcry from the military personnel 
L 
ensued, due to the fact that many troops that took the anthrax vaccine experienced adverse health 
effects, varying in severity. Troops continue to refuse the vaccine and suffer the consequences, 
and so the debate continues on whether it is ethical to have a mandatory anthrax vaccination 
program for the United States military forces, especially when the long-term effects of the 
vaccine are unknown and have not been conclusively studied. In addition, the vaccine is 
currently only tested and approved for cutaneous anthrax, not the inhalation form that would be I experienced in combat (Nicolson, Nass, and Nicolson, 2000) 
The issues surrounding tbis controversy will be discussed, including an overview of the 
anthrax bacterium, the history of the vaccine's development, safety and efficacy, the history of 
the military's adoption of the vaccine, and current issues involving the military officials, troops, 
scientists, and pending legislation. The existing problem is that there is not enough hard 
evidence to support giving this vaccine to our troops without knowing all of the potential 
consequences. Because the administration of the vaccine for inhalation anthrax is still 
investigational, it should be treated as such by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the 
military and informed consent should be obtained from the recipients of the vaccine" If the 
vaccine is continually administered as is, the military risks losing more soldiers to side effects of 
the vaccine and also to the fear of taking the vaccine in the first place. In a time as crucial as 
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this, we cannot afford to lose troops, but should provide them with the latest information on the 
vaccine and its known side effects, then let them make their own decision on whether or not they 
will take the vaccine. 
The Anthrax Bacterium 
The biological weapon (BW) commonly known to scientists as Bacillus anthracis is a spore-
forming soil bacterium that is endogenous in some parts of the world, but rarely found in the 
United States. The scientific name for the bacterium is derived from the Greek word anthrakis, 
which means coal, because the disease causes black, coal-like lesions to erupt on the body 
(Inglesby et a!., 1999). Naturally occurring anthrax is a disease that is acquired through contact 
with animals that have anthrax or with any contaminated animal products that are anthrax ~ 
infested. The disease is primarily found in herbivores, which ingest the spores from the soil I 
when eating plant life. Infection with this bacterium can induce death within one to six days of ' 
exposure to a lethal dose (Nicolson, n.d.). 
Forms of Anthrax 
The serious forms of anthrax that can be transmitted to humans are inhalation, cutaneous, and 
intestinal anthrax. Inhalation anthrax symptoms usually resemble a common cold in the early 
stages of infection, and then progress to severe respiratory problems and shock. Once the 
bacteria are in the body and begin replicating and releasing toxins, the body responds with 
hemorrhaging, edema, and necrosis. Even if antibiotics are administered and they neutralize the 
bacteria in the bloodstream, there is a point where the toxins become so powerful that death 
cannot be avoided by any means. Early diagnosis of inhalation anthrax is difficult, and can only 
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be caught with a high level of suspicion on the part of the practitioner. Cutaneous anthrax is a 
result of the introduction of the anthrax spore through the skin; people with previous cuts and 
abrasions are the most susceptible to infection. Areas of exposed skin, such as the arms, face, 
hands, and neck, are the most commonly affected. It is the most common naturally occurring 
form of anthrax, with over 2000 cases reported annually (Inglesby et al., 1999). This form of the 
disease usually follows exposure to anthrax-infested animals. The mortality rate has been 
reported as up to 20% for cases without antibiotic treatment, however with antibiotics, death 
from cutaneous anthrax is rare. The intestinal form may be contracted from contaminated food 
consumption, and is evident by an inflammation ofthe intestinal tract. The treatment is similar 
to that of the aggressive regimen seen in inhalation anthrax, and the mortality rate is reported to 
be high because of difficulty in early diagnosis. If untreated, all forms of anthrax infection can 
lead to septicemia and death (Inglesby et al., 1999). 
Anthrax as a Biological Weapon 
In its spore form, the anthrax bacterium exhibits all of the qualities of an effective biological 
weapon. It is highly infectious, very pathogenic, and stable in the air and environment for the 
period of time needed to disseminate and infect large numbers of people. Anthrax is considered 
very threatening as a lethal biological weapon because it is easily produced, stored and 
disseminated in its spore form (Nicolson et al., 2000). The most recent incident that has raised 
the awareness of the American public was the anthrax-infested letters being sent through the US 
Postal Service shortly after the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001. The anthrax was sent 
in at least five letters to Florida, New York City, and Washington DC. These letters were sent 
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public officials. In all, there were twenty-two confirmed or suspected cases of anthrax in the 
aftermath of9111, as a result of direct or indirect contact with the infected letters. Eleven of the 
cases were inhalation anthrax, 5 of which subsequently died, and eleven of the cases were 
cutaneous anthrax (7 confirmed, 4 suspected) (Inglesby et a!., 2002). It is important to note that 
the person(s) responsible for the anthrax mailings utilized only one of the many possible avenues 
to distribute anthrax. 
Both the World Health Organization and the Office of Technology Assessment have studied 
the technology that might facilitate a large aerosol release of anthrax. Prior to the anthrax attacks 
in 2001, the only sources of information on inhalation anthrax were an epidemic in Sverdlovsk, 
Russia due to an unintended release of anthrax spores from a Soviet bioweapons facility in 1979, ;:--
and 18 occupational exposure cases in the US during the 201h century. An aerosol attack using 
anthrax would be odorless and invisible, and would be able to travel many miles before 
dissipating. The technology necessary to facilitate such an aerial release has been developed and 
tested by both Iraq and the former Soviet Union. Both the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the Office of Technology Assessment have conducted studies regarding the spread of 
anthrax when distributed in this manner, and the results are staggering. One estimate said that if 
50kg of anthrax were released over an urban population of around five million people, it would 
result in 250,000 sick people and 100,000 deaths. Another study resulted in a 32-mile long line 
of anthrax being sprayed, which subsequently traveled more than 60 miles before it became non-
infectious (Inglesby, eta!., 2002). The 2001 anthrax attacks have served to raise awareness as 
well as paranoia that a terrorist group could potentially mount a large-scale aerosol bioweapons 
attack against the United States. 
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Research on anthrax as a bioweapon began over 80 years ago, but most national offensive 
bioweapons programs were terminated following the ratification of the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) in the 1970's. However, some countries continued their development of 
these weapons in spite oftheir ratification of the BWC. Iraq acknowledged that they maintained 
an anthrax production and weaponizing program to the United Nations Special Commission in 
1995. Another country that is known to have maintained production of anthrax is the former 
Soviet Union (Inglesby, et a!., 2002). According to a recent analysis, there is still a high 
potential that at least 13 countries have continued to house offensive biological weapons (Center 
for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002). 
Methods to Counter Anthrax 
There are currently several methods to counter anthrax when used as a biological weapon. 
First of all, there are prophylactic antibiotics. In order to be effective, these antibiotics must be 
administered within a short period of time before or after anthrax exposure. However, once a 
person infected with the anthrax bacteria has begun to show signs of illness, the antibiotics can 
no longer prevent a lethal infection. The second option is passive immunization, which entails 
the administration of immune sera or monoclonal antibodies, which are not currently available. 
This administration must be done in a hospital or other monitored environment, as the mode of 
entry is typically intravenous. Active vaccination is the third option, which is appealing because 
as long as immunity is maintained, the vaccine can be given years before exposure and still be !---
considered effective. Its effectiveness is maintained as long as enough immunity is built up to 
neutralize the anthrax bacteria before the pattern of mass replication from its inactive spore form 
initiates and lethal toxins are deposited into the body (Nicolson et a!., 2000). 
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History of Anthrax Vaccine Development and Efficacy 
Though the active vaccination method may sound like the most promising method of 
protection against the anthrax bacteria, the vaccine as it currently exists may not be up to the 
task. Although the vaccine can protect against small doses of the anthrax bacteria that can infect 
surface skin wounds, there is no scientific evidence that the current anthrax vaccine, which is the 
topic of so much controversy, will actually immunize humans against a lethal aerosol dose of 
inhalation anthrax spores. Animal studies have been performed, however there are no human 
studies that can estimate the long-term effects of this vaccine on human beings. The Department 
= 
of Defense has repeatedly stated that this vaccine is safe and effective, however they insist on 
using it off-label by indicating that it is effective against inhalation anthrax, when the vaccine is 
only approved for use against cutaneous anthrax. The vaccine has a history that began with wool 
workers that were exposed to anthrax (Sidel, Cohen & Gould, 2002). 
The Anthrax Vaccine History 
A man named George Wright developed the original anthrax vaccine in the 1950's, and this 
vaccine was mass-produced by Merck (Medical Readiness, 1999). In 1962, Brachman and his 
colleagues working at what was then known as the Communicable Disease Center were able to 
perform a controlled trial of a version of the anthrax vaccine, The results of this trial showed 
that the vaccine as it existed was effective in preventing cutaneous anthrax in woolen mill 
workers (Sidel et a!., 2002). After this study, the manufacturing process on the original vaccine 
was changed, and the Michigan Department of Public Health (MDPH) began producing the 
vaccine (Medical Readiness, 1999). In the original trial performed by Brachman, there were not 
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enough cases of inhalation anthrax to satisfactorily deduce that the vaccine would prove effective 
in preventing this type of anthrax infection. To infect humans with inhalation anthrax on 
purpose would obviously be unethical, however several animal studies have suggested that there 
is a chance the vaccine may be able to prevent inhalation anthrax. Based on these inconclusive 
studies alone, the Department of Defense began using the vaccine for that "off-label" purpose 
(Side] et al., 2002). 
A major concern related to the anthrax vaccine is the source. Many of the military vaccines 
administered to our service people are from 'sole-source' manufacturers, thus making it difficult 
to obtain specific information on the anthrax vaccine and how it was determined to be safe. The 
FDA mandates that many strict production and safety requirements must be met, and evidence 
for effectiveness in humans should be documented prior to the FDA releasing approval for 
production and sale of the vaccine. In the case of the current anthrax vaccine, however, there 
seems to be several faults with this system (Nicolson et al., 2000). 
The original producer of this vaccine was Michigan Biologic Products, Inc. of the Michigan 
State Department of Health, which is a state-owned corporation that obtained U. S. Government 
approval for the anthrax vaccine before FDA approval was required. The Bureau of Biologics at 
NIH approved the anthrax vaccine developed by Michigan Biologic Products, Inc. in 1970, two 
years before efficacy data were reviewed and approval required by the FDA. At the time of 
submission, no long-term safety data were supplied with the license application, and none have 
been submitted to this day (Nicolson et al., 2000). 
Michigan Biologic Products Inc. (MBPI) had been warned by the FDA of their intent to 
revoke their license to produce vaccines because of violations regarding their production and 
testing methods. On March 11, 1997, the FDA issued a warning letter to MBPI, stating that their 
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license would be revoked unless immediate action was taken to resolve deficiencies. The FDA 
cited numerous problems with equipment, control of components, drug product containers and 
closures, production and process controls, and laboratory controls (FDA Warns, 1997). Though 
MBPI received a written notification from the FDA that they had not complied with the 
requirements to address the violations as issued in their report, they were allowed to remain open 
for business with a waiver, pending FDA compliance. This waiver was granted with the 
rationale that they were the sole manufacturer of the anthrax vaccine. During this time, anthrax 
vaccine lots were distributed to the military. These lots were later re-tested and only 6 of the 31 
lots passed initial supplemental inspection . Many of the lots had either expired or had been re-
dated for an additional 3 years once or even twice in some cases. The British Gulf War veterans, ~-
after having the vaccine lots independently tested, reported that they appeared to be 
contaminated with "unknown microorganisms," thus indicating that some ofthe health problems 
associated with this vaccine could have been related to possible vaccine contamination within 
MBPI (Nicolson et a!., 2000). 
Bioport, Inc. has since purchased the original license for the anthrax vaccine and the facility 
of Michigan Biologic Products, Inc. of the Michigan State Department of Health. This new 
company is owned by a group of investors lead by Admiral William Crowe, Jr., former head of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD, and Faud El-Hibri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent who 
has since obtained American citizenship. Bioport, Inc. was sold to Admiral Crowe's investment 
group after the decision was made by the DOD to utilize the anthrax vaccine on all of the U. S. 
armed forces. This and other issues that have arisen have motivated a congressional 
investigation into the financial relationship between the DOD and the new owners ofBioport, 
Inc., and the possibility of a conflict of interest (Nicolson et a!., 2000). 
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In September of2000, according to Williams (2000), Bioport Inc. was cited for using an 
expired lot of the vaccine; they had failed to gain the FDA's approval to produce new lots of the 
vaccine. Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) stated that the "Pentagon is locked in a dependent 
relationship with a new, unproven company. Resting on so weak a foundation, the anthrax 
vaccine program may not be safe or sustainable" (Daniels, 1999). Shays continued by referring 
back to the Government Reform Committee Report and its assessment that the anthrax vaccine is 
still in the investigational stages in relation to the defense against biological warfare. He 
specifically criticized the Department of Defense for showing favoritism towards the vaccine's 
manufacturer, Bioport Inc, and warned that they may not survive the FDA's investigations and ; 
= 
strict standards outside of this government vaccine contract (Eberhart, 200la). t-
Efficacy of the Anthrax Vaccine 
The original vaccine, developed by George Wright, was tested on mill workers and found to 
be efficacious when used for cutaneous anthrax. In contrast, however, the vaccine licensed in 
1970 has only been tested for efficacy in animals. These animal studies have focused primarily 
on determining the levels of protection that the licensed vaccine can offer against inhalation 
anthrax. Although the animal studies have shown some promising results, it would be erroneous 
to assume that these results mean that the vaccine would also be effective to protect humans 
against inhalation anthrax (Medical Readiness, 1999). 
The study conducted by Brachman is the only one that tests the efficacy of the anthrax 
vaccine on humans, and uses the original vaccine (developed by Wright). However, because this 
vaccine is different from the vaccine that was eventually licensed, additional data were required 
to be submitted to the Division of Biologics, Department ofHealth, Education, and Welfare 
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(HEW) in support of the license application for the altered vaccine in 1969. The HEW 
committee decided that the data were inconclusive and efficacy could not be assumed. The 
Army also weighed in on the issue in 1991, stating that it cannot be scientifically assumed that 
the vaccine would be effective if used under different circumstances than those in which the 
original trial was performed. The only assumption that can logically be made is that the 
epidemiological evidence from the original vaccine can be applied to the licensed (MDPH) 
vaccine, and that the licensed vaccine is effective in protecting against cutaneous anthrax. In 
order to prove protection against inhalation anthrax, however, more testing must be performed 
specifically on that indication (Medical Readiness, 1999). 
1 
r 
There are many questions surrounding the anthrax vaccine's efficacy, particularly when 
different biological weapons are combined to make an overwhelming weapon. This vaccine has 
been and continues to be administered by the military to over one million men and women, and 
the military claims that it is highly effective against biological weapons. This claim essentially 
refers to the vaccine's effectiveness against weaponized anthrax, which consists of strains of the 
bacteria that have been altered to be more highly pathogenic and evasive than the strains found in 
the environment. However, there is no published scientific evidence that this claim is true. The 
existing published data do not cover the effectiveness of different vaccines when a human 
inhales anthrax spores, and the data do not address highly pathogenic strains of the bacteria that 
would most likely be in a bioweapon attack (Nicholson, n.d.). 
In addition, there are currently no published scientific studies that are meant to test the 
hypothesis that vaccines are able to protect against simultaneous exposure to multiple 
aerosolized agents, or that there is even a vaccine that protects an individual against all strains of 
a given biological agent (Nicolson, n.d.). The trend in biological warfare is the "Russian doll 
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cocktail," which combines multiple microorganisms plus macrophages and other inhibitors in 
order to break down the body's first line of defense. The Secretary of the Army, Louis Caldera, 
concluded that there is no way to know for certain that the anthrax being tested in our studies of 
efficacy will be the same strains that are encountered in warfare (Daniels, 1999). 
Military Adoption of the Anthrax Vaccine and Health Consequences 
In an effort to respond to the growing threat of bioterrorism and biological weapons being 
used against the military, in 1998 the Department of Defense launched the Anthrax Vaccine 
Immunization Program, more commonly known as AVIP. This program mandated a force-wide, 
mandatory anthrax vaccination and maintenance of the immunization with the required booster 
shots over a period of 18 months. Numerous sources spoke out against the DOD's program, 
citing that the efficacy of the anthrax vaccine has not been proven and the potential for adverse 
experiences in the vaccine recipients is not fully understood (Sidel et al., 2002). As a result, this 
program has been heavily criticized, and in response to service members complaining about the 
insensitivity to adverse health effects, poor medical record keeping and overpowering program 
operation, the House Government Reform Committee initiated an oversight investigation into the 
design and implementation of the AVIP (House Committee, 2000). The committee operated 
under the philosophy that the anthrax vaccine is still being studied as a potential causative or 
contributing factor in Gulf War veterans' illnesses, and therefore should be measured against the 
standard that continued use of the vaccine should be carefully explored and only used as L 
necessary. After the investigation, their conclusion was that the vaccine program did not meet 
either criterion, and in fact, failed miserably. According to the report, the A VIP does not have a 
stable standard of care and tries to reach those who are not at risk in addition to those that are at 
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risk (House Committee, 2000). The report goes on further to state that as a mandatory, force-
wide countermeasure to the real threat of weaponized anthrax on the battlefield the vaccine effort 
is unrealistic. It expands and distorts the use of invasive, dated medical technology to address 
perceived weaknesses in detection technology and external physical protection against biological 
attack. The report describes the A VIP as a huge military undertaking that is built on a shaky 
scientific and medical foundation (House Committee, 2000). The aforementioned Shay's report 
directly addresses the fact that there is no reliable information regarding how much protection 
the vaccine offers, who is able to acquire this protection, and how long the protection will last. 
The amazing amount of faith that the Department of Defense is marketing is being backed up 
with a miniscule amount of scientific proof. Many of the men and women of the armed forces 
do not share this faith in the vaccine and the associated program. The House Government 
Reform Committee Report suggests that the military personnel are not convinced that the small 
amount of evidence related to vaccine efficacy outweighs the potential for problems in the long 
term with the safety of the vaccine (House Committee, 2000). 
The A VIP program was poorly plauned and even more poorly executed, leaving little room 
for flexibility. In order to achieve military objectives, the A VIP program has been accused of 
sacrificing the quality of care and the practice of medicine (House Committee, 2000). Instead of 
pursuing the development of a better vaccine, or at the very least, a shorter inoculation schedule, 
the A VIP was launched without regard to the repercussions that could affect the men and women 
of the military. Instead, they went forward with using a 1950's era vaccine, which requires a 
lengthy inoculation period of six shots over 18 months. This task in and of itself is 
overwhehning, considering the 2.4 million active duty and reserve members of the armed forces. 
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and cannot succeed as it is currently organized (House Committee, 2000). Shay himself stated, 
"In the early 1990s, the Department of Defense faced a fork in the road to effective force 
protection and picked the wrong path" (Williams, 2000). 
APHA Recommendations 
In response to the growing controversy regarding the anthrax vaccine and its potential effects 
on the men and women of the military, the American Public Health Association released the 
following recommendations: 
1. The US Department of Defense should delay any further immunization against anthrax using 
the current vaccine or at least make immunization voluntary; and 
2. A commission of military and non-military public health experts should be formed to review 
the evidence for effectiveness and safety of the current vaccine and the time at which an 
improved vaccine may be available, and to make recommendations about the continuation ofthe 
current immunization program (Anthrax Immunization. 1999). 
Anthrax Vaccine Safety 
Safety remains at the top of the list of concerns surrounding the anthrax vaccine. The A VIP 
program is under increasing attack, led by at least 1,500 service people that have complained of 
side effects with varying severity that they blame on the vaccine (Williams, 2000). Hundreds of 
the service people have chosen not to be inoculated as a result of these fears, and have been 
either disciplined or discharged. Rather than take the inoculations, members ofthe reserve and 
National Guard simply resigned, followed by at least 250 military pilots. According to Williams 
(2000), there is no way to know the exact number of soldiers that have suffered from adverse 
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reactions to the anthrax vaccination, and no way to know how many of those reactions should be ~-
considered either severe or long-term. The question remains, why are so many of our armed 
forces refusing this vaccine, and putting their jobs on the line to take such a stand? The bottom 
line, according to several sources, is that there is no evidence that the current anthrax vaccine 
will be effective or safe in stopping a lethal dose ofweaponized anthrax spores (Nicholson eta!., 
2000). The U. S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Disease (USAMRIID) has 
stated that the anthrax vaccine is safe, citing an adverse reaction rate of one per 50,000 doses 
(less than 0.002%). However this rate has since been revised to 0.02-0.2% or higher, and these 
rates are currently being questioned as well. Dover Air Force Base, for example, has a rate of L 
chronic health problems after receiving the anthrax vaccine that may be as high as 7%. The 
difference is that the official rates are for acute reactions only (Nicolson eta!., 2000). t 
The primary method of assessing a vaccine's safety is for the FDA to carefully review the I 
reported adverse events collected through the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System 
(V AERS). According to standard procedure, a FDA-approved contractor should independently 
record these adverse events. The contractor sends this data to the FDA, where a committee 
evaluates the adverse events for the likelihood of their being caused by the vaccination. In the 
case of the anthrax vaccine, however, the military physicians were told that only certain adverse 
events could be attributable to the vaccine, including allergic reactions (localized at the injection 
site), and that other reactions such as joint pain or cognitive disturbances could not be caused by 
the vaccine. In addition, the attending physicians had no access to published data on the side 
effects of the anthrax vaccine, and the Physicians Desk Reference contained no entry for this 
vaccine. Because of this procedure, only reactions that resulted in hospitalization or immediate 
loss of 24 hours of duty time were reported to a military clearing-house for vaccine reactions. 
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This procedure has changed recently, and the hope is that other adverse vaccine effects will now 
be recorded in the patient's medical records. Many sources believe that the anthrax vaccine is no 
different from any other commercial vaccine, and should be treated as such in the process of 
safety evaluation (Nicolson et. a!., 2000). 
Adverse Event Reporting 
Adverse event reporting becomes yet another problem when faced with the facts that many of 
our service people afflicted with adverse anthrax vaccine reactions are reluctant to seek medical 
care, as they have watched their colleagues' concerns being attributed to depression or stress. 
Another fear of reporting such adverse events is that they could potentially lose their ability to ~--
perform their duties. For example, many of the pilots and airmen at Dover Air Force Base are 
after they received their anthrax vaccinations (Nicolson eta!., 2000). I now on DNIF (duties not including flying) status because of undiagnosed illnesses that began 
Lt. Colonel Randy Randolf, director of the U. S. Army's vaccination program, describes 
adverse events beyond those at the injection site as muscle aches, joint aches, headaches, rash, 
chills, fever, nausea, loss of appetite, malaise, or related symptoms, and that they are experienced 
by 5% up to 35% of people receiving the vaccine. One study sought to determine the outcome of 
anthrax administration in a military field hospital. The results showed that the prevalence of 
adverse reactions to the anthrax vaccine was higher than expected, and the initial affect on the 
military was the incapacitation of around 18% of the personnel. Because many of the military 
personnel do not want to comply with further vaccines after the initial reaction, the immunization 
strategy needs to be revisited in order to encourage better compliance and safety (Hayes, 2000). 
No completed studies exist that document the long-term effects of this vaccine on humans. 
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There is a distinct difference between military and civilian physicians in their acceptance of 
the possibility that a vaccine can potentially cause an adverse event even after the initial vaccine 
reporting period. Dover AFB personnel exhibited a higher than normal rate of signs and 
symptoms that can surface well after the vaccine adverse event reporting period, such as 
vomiting, diarrhea, polyarthralgias, fever, splenic tenderness, cognitive problems, polymyalgias, 
and weakness and numbness. There are several groups of individuals that are more susceptible to 
an adverse reaction to the vaccine, including those that have preexisting autoimmune conditions 
such as rheumatoid arthritis, lupus, multiple sclerosis, or those with neurological disease such as 
childhood polio (Nicolson eta!., 2000). 
There have been several reports of very serious, life-threatening reactions in military 
personnel after anthrax vaccination, such as an allergic reaction that causes the loss of skin and 
the lining of the GI tract, or even seizures with complete loss of consciousness. Many ofthese 
symptoms have not been previously identified as potential side effects of other vaccines, and 
many of the people reporting such symptoms and side effects have not had a complete physical 
examination (including immunological testing). Therefore, it is unclear exactly how the anthrax 
vaccine may be causing such illnesses. Garth Nicolson, the Chief Scientific Officer and 
Professor at The Institute for Molecular Medicine, holds the belief that the practice of 
vaccinating military personnel with multiple immunizations at one time could result in immune 
suppression of the individual's system. This immunosuppression can lead to any number of 
opportunistic infections that may not have otherwise manifested themselves (Nicolson, n.d.). 
Military Personnel Reaction to Anthrax Vaccine 
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The members of the military have been very vocal regarding the issues surrounding the 
vaccination program. Though the resistance to the vaccine is still small, the Pentagon is being 
forced to deal with increasing numbers of soldiers refusing the vaccine. Only a small number of 
the military personnel that are required to receive the beginning of the anthrax shot regimen and 
have refused have subsequently been punished. The Pentagon currently dismisses the resistance 
as insignificant, but the officials have stopped their count of how many military personnel have 
refused the vaccine (Myers, 1999). 
The refusals of the anthrax vaccine began with military personnel in areas such as the Pacific 
and the Persian Gulf, who were the first in line to receive this vaccination due to their close 
proximity to North Korea and Iraq. As the vaccination program moves into the United States 
military bases, the rebellion against the vaccine is believed to be growing. The General 
Accounting Office (a division of the Congress) reported that around 4,400 pilots and crew in the 
air force and air national guard have either resigned their position or requested reassignment in 
order to eliminate the possibility oftaking the anthrax vaccine. It is estimated that around 18% 
of the aircrew left the service even though they did not yet qualify for retirement benefits, due to 
the fears of side effects from the vaccine (Charatan, 2000). The anthrax vaccination is an order, 
and to refuse the order is to incur punishment. Because the shots cannot be forced upon the 
troops, many of the ones who have refused have been discharged under either the general 
heading or in some cases, bad conduct. 
There are many reasons why military men and women are refusing the vaccine, particularly 
that there is not currently a way to test the anthrax vaccine on the same type of anthrax that 
would be encountered in a bioweapon (Myers, 1999). They are also critical of the lack oflong-
term research on the recipients of the vaccine during the Persian Gulf War. The FDA and their 
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criticism of the vaccine's manufacturer, Bioport, Inc., is not inspiring the military personnel to 
line up for the vaccine either. These pockets of resistance can significantly affect the readiness 
of the units, especially with the National Guard and reserve units, who can more easily resign 
than active duty military personnel (Myers, 1999). 
Militarv Lawsuits Related to the Anthrax Vaccine 
Some of these service men and women have filed lawsuits in order to attempt to counteract 
their dismissal from the military. Perhaps one of the best examples of such a case is Captain 
John Buck, a 32-year-old emergency room physician, was accused of disobeying an order to take 
the vaccine before deployment to the Middle East in October of2000. Buck is arguing that the 
order to take the anthrax vaccination is not lawful because the administration of an experimental 
drug would require the consent of the recipient. Rep. Christopher Shays issued a statement on 
behalf of Buck, and maintained that Buck's choice to refuse the anthrax vaccine because it was 
not being used in a manner for which it was approved was raising questions, both legal and 
ethical, about the viability ofthe anthrax vaccination program. By asking the doctor to take or 
administer the anthrax vaccine off-label, the military is asking Buck to knowingly violate the 
Hippocratic oath that he took when he became a doctor (Eberhart, 2001a). Over the course of 
the court-martial trial, Buck's lawyers have unearthed a great deal of damaging information that 
will be used against the government. An email from Brig. Gen. Eddie Cain, former director of 
the Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, states, "I will work the BioPort [anthrax 
vaccine manufacturer] oversight plan, but believe we are digging ourselves a hole that will be too 
difficult to crawl out. .. " (Eberhart, 2001a). According to Shay, Gen. Cain should be fearful, 
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in warfare, and concerns that the safety of the vaccine has not been effectively monitored 
(Eberhart, 200la). One of the defense witnesses, Dr. Kwai Chan of the General Accounting 
Office (GAO), had told the House Government Reform Committee in 1999 that the vaccine that 
the military used to inoculate its members is not the same vaccine that the Pentagon studied for 
effectiveness (Eberhart, 2001a). Shay maintains "It's long past time to give up this futile effort 
to drag a 1950's medical technology into the 21st century. No one else's health should be put at 
risk, and no more military careers should be destroyed on the altar of this unquestionably failed 
vaccine program" (Eberhart, 2001a). Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.), House Government Reform 
Committee Chairman, has pledged more hearings to push the military into either letting the 
AVIP program dissolve or making it purely voluntary for the soldiers. He warned, 'The Defense 
Department is giving this investigational vaccine without informed consent. Doing research on 
our troops without their knowledge or permission is wrong" (FDA says illness, 2000). 
Lawmaker Involvement in Anthrax Vaccine Issues 
Several lawmakers agree with this assessment, and have been taking action to either ban the 
use of the vaccine on the military, or at the very least make its use voluntary. In April 2001, 
Mary Rogeness, Massachusetts State Representative, introduced legislation to prohibit the 
administration of experimental drugs and vaccines to members of the Massachusetts militia. The 
bill would force the Massachusetts adjutant general to refrain from administration of any drug or 
vaccine to any member of the armed services in Massachusetts unless it is licensed by the U.S. t 
Food and Drug administration and used as it is labeled in accordance with the FDA rules and has 
been proven to be safe and effective through extensive clinical trials (Eberhart, 2001b). Rep. 
Rogeness began to champion this cause after hearing the case of Capt. Jason M. Nietupski who, 
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after receiving the anthrax vaccine, has experienced very serious medical problems. Neitupski's 
medical problems since the anthrax vaccine include chronic fatigue syndrome, liver damage, and 
blood clots in his leg. These problems began surfacing before he received his third anthrax 
booster in March 2000. Rogeness hopes that this legislation will overturn the current federal 
regulations and help the state's military forces (Lauerman, 2001). 
Another bill that was introduced was intended to completely do away with the A VIP until the 
FDA either approves a new vaccine or reduces the boosters on the current vaccine (Jones Calls, 
1999). Congressman Walter B. Jones (R-NC) is a member of the House Committee on Armed 
Services, and introduced this legislation (HR 2543) in an attempt to make the A VIP program 
voluntary for all the members of the U.S military. Jones' bill, called the American Military 
Health Protection Act, would make the Department of Defense's AVIP program voluntary until 
certain conditions are met. Jones feels that the concern among our military stems from the fact I that there is no clinical study with conclusive results that definitively addresses the long-term 
side effects of using the anthrax vaccine on human beings. The promises of safety from the 
Department of Defense have not been backed up with any legitimate support. Jones believes that 
until the troops are satisfied with the level of information and long-term studies, they should be 
allowed to make this very important health decision for themselves (Jones Calls, 1999). 
Rep. Benjamin A. Gihnan (NY-20) introduced HR 2548, which is a two-fold legislation to 
stop the A VIP until the vaccine is proven to be safe and effective, and also to initiate a study by 
the National Institutes of Health that would further research the anthrax vaccine (Bill summary, L 
n.d.). This legislation, formally koown as the Department of Defense Anthrax Vaccination 
Moratorium Act, was introduced on September 19, 1999, and remains referred to the 
Subcommittee on Health and Environment. This legislation has two primary goals: to express 
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that "(1) a single protection measure such as the mandatory anthrax vaccine immunization 
program should not be implemented by the Department of Defense (DOD) without regard to its 
effect on morale, retention, recruiting, and budget; and (2) an insufficiently proven vaccine 
should not be advocated as a substitute for research, development, and production of truly 
effective vaccines and antibiotics, adequate protective equipment, and nonproliferation 
measures" (Bill summary, n.d.). The legislation also requires two things: (1) an independent 
study of the effectiveness and safety of the vaccine and (2) a report from the Director of the NIH 
to specified congressional committees on study results. In addition, the bill calls for expedited 
consideration for former or current military personnel with regard to remedies for adverse 
personnel actions that were the result of the vaccine program (Bill summary, n.d.). 
Informed Consent 
Informed consent is the process by which an informed individual participates in making 
decisions about their healthcare. This practice stems from the right for an individual to direct 
what happens to their body as well as the ethical obligation of the doctor to involve the patient in 
the healthcare process. A typical informed consent will contain the following components: 
nature of the decision/procedure, reasonable alternatives to the proposed intervention, any 
relevant risks, benefits, or uncertainties that are associated with each alternative, a way to assess 
the patient's understanding of the procedure, and an indication of acceptance ofthe risk( s) by the 
patient. Informed consent is used to ensure that the patient understands the risks and benefits of 
a particular intervention, such as minor or major surgery. It is also used in experimental 
medication studies, such as pharmaceutical clinical trials, and is careful to point out that the 
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patient understands that their participation is voluntary and they can discontinue at any time 
(Edwards, 1998). 
Investigational New Drugs and Informed Consent 
In order to administer an investigational new drug (IND) to a research subject, an 
organization is required to obtain an informed consent. The DoD has been quite compliant with 
these regulations in the past, however this all changed during the Gulf War. There were two 
pharmaceuticals that held hopes of being effective against both chemical warfare and biological 
warfare, and they were both considered to be INDs by the FDA. In order to be in compliance 
with the FDAs regulations, the DoD would have had to obtain informed consent from every 
troop to whom they administered these pharmaceuticals, and that did not seem very practical. 
The DoD also argued that by allowing military personnel to refuse the drugs that were meant for 
their protection, they could potentially jeopardize combat effectiveness by putting themselves at 
risk for a disabling infection. The DoD requested that the FDA waive the informed consent 
requirements and grant waivers for these two pharmaceuticals that were to be used in the Gulf 
War (Waiving Informed Consent, 2000). 
The FDA decided that obtaining informed consent from every troop may not be feasible in 
some of the combat-related scenarios, and that by withholding these INDs, they may be putting 
more lives at risk by going against the best interests of the military personnel. The FDA put this 
in writing in what is known as the "Informed Consent for Human Drugs and Biologics; 
Determination that Informed Consent is Not Feasible". The controversy that ensued was 
primarily related to the difference between "research" and "treatment." The opponents of the 
waiver used the argument that an IND is considered to be "research" because the effects, risks, 
' j-
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and potential benefits of the treatment are unknown. In these cases, informed consent is 
mandatory. In addition, they argued that any organization seeking to have their pharmaceutical 
in widespread use could change their stated intentions and have an experimental treatment 
appear to be treatment and completely bypass the informed consent requirements. In contrast, 
those in favor of the waiver hold that the DoD has an ethical responsibility to protect the 
members of the military from any potential harm that may come to them while in combat 
(Waiving Informed Consent, 2000). 
Due to poor record keeping, less than adequate data collection, and similar violations of the 
terms of the waiver, the DoD's ability to administer informed consent waivers was questioned. 
After many years of debate and discussion, the FDA published a "Request for Comments" 
document in an attempt to determine if the waiver rule should be revoked, changed, or somehow 
I replaced with a form of informed consent for the troops. While the FDA was ready to revoke the waiver rule despite all discussion to the contrary, Congress decided that the waiver capability 
should reside with the President alone (Waiving Informed Consent, 2000). Executive Order 
13139, signed in 1999 by then-President Clinton, does not allow the DOD to administer 
investigational new drugs to service members without their informed consent, except in times of 
national emergency (Institute for Health Freedom, 2000). 
Recommendation 
Based on the research performed and the data collected, the most effective solution to this 
dilemma is to adopt HR-2548, which is Rep. Gilman's legislation that would stop the AVIP until 
the vaccine is proven safe and efficacious, as well as provide for a NIH study that will further 
research the vaccine to establish its safety, efficacy, and possible ways to make treatment shorter 
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or more simple (Bill Summary, n.d.). In addition, the bill HR-2543, introduced by Rep. Jones, 
should be considered because it makes the A VIP voluntary for the military servicemen and 
women (Jones Calls, 1999). These two bills would make it possible to suspend the AVIP 
pending further research on the current anthrax vaccine, particularly in the arena of inhalation 
anthrax, and will allow the military personnel to make a personal choice of whether or not they 
wish to take the vaccine as it is currently offered. The military personnel should all be required 
to receive and read information regarding the vaccine so that they can make an informed 
decision on whether or not the vaccine is in their best interest, and can then act accordingly. By 
making the program voluntary, each soldier would be in control of the medication entering their 
bodies, and therefore willingly choosing what they feel is in their best interest. L 
Conclusion 
Three principles for determining the ethics of a research protocol were identified in 1978 by 
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research's Behnont Report. An ethical research protocol will have respect for persons, 
beneficence, and justice. This is the section of the report that is an issue in the dispute over 
waiving informed consent for the military. It is well known that by swearing an oath to the 
military and our country, the personnel in the military are willingly surrendering some of their 
autonomy regarding their life decisions. However, while this is admirable, should soldiers lose 
all autonomy, including decisions related to their health? The A VIP was put into place because 
the DoD believes that the long shot regimen necessitates the vaccination of all of the troops in 
the event that they face a biological threat. With the current data that raise significant questions 
regarding the safety and efficacy of the anthrax vaccine, and taking into account the DoD's 
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recent history with INDs, it is not surprising that many military personnel have doubts about 
subjecting themselves to the anthrax vaccine (Cummings, n.d.) 
As evidenced by several legislative proposals and many advocacy groups, the best way to 
handle the controversy with the anthrax vaccination would be to make the program voluntary for 
our military personnel. These men and women risk their lives for our country, and at least 
deserve the right to determine what experimental substances should be allowed into their bodies. 
The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. (AAPS) advocates that consent 
cannot be informed if the science is not firm and cannot be backed up with credible research 
design and data, and that will identify ifthere are significant adverse effects. The AAPS points 
out that the entire point of having military personnel sign informed consent forms for vaccines 
used in combat is not to keep the soldiers from getting the necessary protection, but to let them 
decide whether or not they feel the potential risks are worth the potential benefits (Orient, 1999). 
According to the Department of Defense, informed consent from members of the military is 
not necessary before administering the anthrax vaccine. The official website maintained by the 
DOD states that the vaccine is fully licensed by the FDA and consent is therefore not required. 
Those receiving the vaccine will be given vaccine information, and may request it anytime after 
vaccination (AVIP, n.d.). However, the military personnel that are being ordered to take this 
vaccine must choose between obeying a direct order and putting a substance into their bodies 
that could potentially do more harm than good. Once military service is complete, the uniform is 
left behind, however the anthrax vaccine remains forever. Many of our men and women in 
uniform did not realize they were making that kind of commitment when they enlisted in the 
military (One Hundred Sixth Congress, 1999). 
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